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1. Introduction 
 
A serious discussion of capitalism and its development cannot avoid the confrontation, at one 
moment or another, with ethical issues. Historically, there have been quite a number of 
different positions in the debate – giving us a sense that the confrontation is, indeed, a 
complex one. When it comes to the connection between ethics and capitalism, we can 
differentiate between at least four different ideal typical perspectives.  
 First, we find what we call the missionary perspective. „Missionaries‟ are in general 
associated with the liberal tradition. They picture capitalism as a deeply and naturally ethical 
system and as, in fact, a structural condition for the development and stabilization of ethical 
behaviour. Discussions in the 1990s around the corruption and dysfunctions associated with 
the Communist heritage fit in there. The idea was that unethical behaviour on a large-scale 
was a systemic heritage from the Communist times and that the move towards a capitalist 
logic was the necessary precondition to ethics and ethical behaviour in the economy. 
Missionaries tend to believe, and argue, that the capitalist market necessarily goes together 
with political freedom and democracy, and together with social but also moral progress 
(Knight, 1982; Knight and Merriam, 1979; Hayeck 1962). 
 A second perspective can be termed here „Nietzschean‟ in that it positions capitalism 
beyond – or before – ethics. Here again, the intellectual inspiration can be traced back to 
classical liberalism but the focus has been the „natural‟, ie pre-historical, pre-social and hence 
pre-ethical character of the capitalist logic. There is a double consequence here. On the one 
hand, capitalism as a natural order is ultimately inescapable and unavoidable. On the other 
hand, the boundaries between ethics and capitalism are and should be watertight. The business 
of business is to make profits and create wealth. Ethical preoccupations should remain absent 
from both the capitalist logic and the economic realm so as not to muddy and tamper with 
natural forces and dynamics (Friedman 1962, Brennan and Hamlin 1995). Within this second 
perspective, capitalism is an a-moral economic order that can readily articulate with different 
types of social, political and ethical systems. It can, in particular, accommodate itself of 
political dictatorship as the cohabitation in Chile between the „Chicago Boys‟ and the 
Pinochet regime has for example historically shown (Valdès 1995, Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
Babb 2002).  
 The third perspective is a critical one and the argument here is that capitalism is a 
profoundly and essentially unethical system. Critical perspectives have different intellectual 
roots but they are in particular associated with certain strands of Christian thought and with 
the Marxist tradition broadly understood (Leo XIII, 1891; Pius XI, 1931; Belloc, 1977; Marx 
and Engels, 1998; Wallerstein, 2000). Individual greed and power are the motors of the 
capitalist logic and the consequence, from that perspective, is exploitation. Exploitation in 
turn can manifest itself in many different forms – between individuals, across classes, gender, 
ethnic or religious groups or across nations for example. Here, the logical consequence is that 
overcoming the capitalist logic is a necessary precondition to an ethical world – likely to be 
reached only through a revolutionary platform. Such a perspective had been considerably 
weakened during the 1990s with the demise of Communism. However, the consequences of 
globalization for certain groups and countries associated with the multiplication of corporate 
scandals, at the heart of the capitalist system have recently revived that perspective, at least 
within parts of the anti-globalization movement. 
 We label the fourth ideal-typical perspective the „regulatory one‟. The argument here 
is that capitalism is not a naturally ethical or self-regulating system. The idea, though, is that it 
can be – and needs to be – combined with regulatory efforts to create the conditions for 
ethical behaviours and interactions (Dunning, 2001; 2003). Ethics can be defined, from that 
perspective, either as locally and generally nationally grounded codes of conduct or else as a 
set of universally applicable norms (Küng 2003). With the first definition, the regulatory 
effort will likely be driven by the national state or national political institutions (Clegg, Ibarra-
Colado and Bueno-Rodriques, 1998). The second definition implies a quite different 
regulatory frame, where states play a role but are not the only actors. Transnational 
organizations and bodies, of a semi-public and even sometimes of a private nature, will also 
be involved in this case in the regulatory effort (Djelic and Quack 2003, Drori et al. 2003, 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2005). This is the Menchevik tradition that has inspired many 
reformist programs. The Keynesian New Deal also fits here and so does a fair share of the 
contemporary debates on the limits and dangers potentially associated with globalization.  
 In most historical periods, those four perspectives have co-existed, representing 
different intellectual and practical positions on the connection between ethics and capitalism. 
Interestingly, empirical evidence can be found to ground all four of those perspectives – 
although the bodies of data and the methods for data collection will naturally vary. The 
objective of this chapter is to overcome the dichotomy and the opposition between those four 
perspectives. We engage in a genealogical journey and we show that the story is not one of all 
or nothing. Capitalism, we argue has gone historically from being a system with a strong 
ethical foundation to, in a sense, „losing its soul‟ under a combination of different kinds of 
pressures. The contemporary consequence is that capitalism is indeed today a-moral or a-
ethical (rather than immoral or unethical). As a consequence, in the present context, we argue 
that combining capitalism with an ethical agenda will call for regulatory intervention. The 
decision to do so is ultimately political, in the deepest sense of the term (Weber 1959). Such a 
decision should reflect the priorities of given human and social collectives (as expressed in 
national states or wider transnational entities such as the European Union for example). But 
this chapter clearly claims, in the end, that the „iron cage‟ of capitalism cannot be assumed 
today to be a spontaneous ethical order and to self-regulate as such.  
 The chapter starts by unearthing the missing ethical link in the liberal tradition. The 
idea is to show that Adam Smith, the father of liberalism, did not in fact argue that capitalism 
was a spontaneous and natural ethical order. Rather, a full reading of Smith shows that the 
ethical character of capitalism depended upon the existence of a code of morality deeply 
inscribed in individual actors. We show the similarities between this perspective and that 
developed by Max Weber to explain the structuration of modern rational capitalism. Here 
again, a profound ethical structure was shown to underpin and foster the development of 
capitalism. Then, we turn to the next stages – when this deep structure progressively faded 
away and capitalism „lost its soul‟. A marking moment, there, is the period of “Robber 
Barons” capitalism in the United States (Josephson 1932). We show the combined impact, 
then, of ideological shifts and profound structural transformations. Ultimately, this leads us to 
argue, in the conclusion, that contemporary capitalism is a-ethical and that regulatory 
intervention is necessary if we want capitalism to combine with a particular ethical agenda.  
 
 
2. Adam Smith and the Missing Ethical Link  
 
Let us start from the widely shared assumption that Adam Smith‟s An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776, was a defining work that played 
a key role in the emergence of the modern field and science of economics (Smith 1999). As 
such, this particular book has significantly contributed to the ideological and institutional 
structuring of modern capitalism (Blaug 1986, Manent 1987, Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). 
Going back to the text and to the context of its production is illuminating. It shows, in 
particular, that Adam Smith had deep ethical preoccupations but that the latter did not find 
their way into The Wealth of Nations. Smith‟s ethics are to be found in his first book, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, originally published in 1759– a work that has been on the whole 
ignored (Smith, 1982; but see Coase, 1976) Such „division of thought‟ would prove to be 
extremely consequential and the „bible‟ of modern capitalism is, in a sense, missing one leg – 
the ethical one.  
 
2.1 Smith and the Liberal Inspiration 
 
In his economic thinking, Adam Smith was building and expanding upon the contributions of 
the great founders of political liberalism – John Locke in particular. For John Locke, a state of 
nature predated the social contract. In contrast to Hobbes, however, Locke‟s picture of the 
state of nature was not one of essentially chaotic and destructive anarchy. Instead, this state of 
nature was stabilized by natural law – the right to private property based on the work of the 
individual. In the state of nature, each individual was facing nature and interactions between 
these individuals turned around, precisely, that interface. These interactions had to do with 
work, the products of work, property and ownership. Pre-political man – „natural‟ man – was 
clearly in that context an economic man before anything else (Manent, 1986; Locke 1997). 
The social and political contract came only after, as a reaction to potential and real threats to 
the natural order. And the role of this social and political contract was merely to create a 
collective responsibility for the respect of natural law – hence for the protection of private 
property. 
 Building upon the idea of „natural man‟ as economic man, Adam Smith re-affirmed 
strongly both the autonomy of the economic sphere and its moral and historical precedence 
over all other spheres of human life (Smith, 1999). The systematic disembeddedness and self-
contained character of economic activity so characteristic of most orthodox economic 
thinking in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries follow directly upon that. Adam Smith then also took 
over the idea that this preeminent and autonomous economic sphere was by nature a stable 
state, structured as it was by „natural laws‟ – in this case division of labour, invisible hand and 
competition. Economic or natural man had, according to Adam Smith, a natural propensity to 
„truck, barter and exchange one thing for another‟, to exchange the fruits of individual labour 
(Smith 1999: 117). The market was in fact a natural, emergent and essential reality of human 
and social life stemming from this very propensity. The propensity to exchange had for direct 
consequence that each individual did not have to rely only on herself to provide for the whole 
range of her needs. She could find answers to parts of those needs on the market and obtain 
them in exchange for the things she produced. The extent and complexity of the division of 
labour depended upon, in each historical period, the spread and density of the market. The 
latter was itself in direct correlation with the demographic context and with the development 
of infrastructural conditions allowing exchange and the transportation of goods (Smith 1999: 
I, iii). Adam Smith went even further. He argued that the historically progressive extension 
and expansion of markets and the associated advance of the division of labour meant, 
ultimately, greater individual and collective well being as well as, in fact, moral, social and 
political progress away from feudalism and towards yeomanry, away from tyranny and 
towards democracy (Smith 1999, III). 
Another „natural law‟, according to Adam Smith, was that markets were orderly. The 
miracle of that order was that it did not stem from an all-knowing, all-powerful regulator or 
planner. Rather, it emerged from a multiplicity of transactions and their combination. The 
collective good was achieved not by planning it but by leaving free rein to the natural 
propensity of market players to maximize their individual welfare and personal gains. The 
image used by Adam Smith to illustrate the idea of the Invisible Hand has become quite 
famous.  
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to 
their humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own necessities but 
of their advantage (Smith 1999: 119) 
 
Ultimately, however, the multiplicity of such acts motivated by individual selfishness led to a 
collective good. The greediness of individuals turned, through combination in the market, into 
a morally satisfying and welfare maximizing collective order. This was the miracle of the 
invisible hand, which required however specific conditions.  
In particular, the invisible hand would not come to play lest free rein was left to the 
competitive mechanism. Competition emerged, in the work of Adam Smith, as a basic, natural 
and structuring principle of the market. In a market where competition was left free rein, the 
scarcity of a particular good should naturally lead to the emergence of new providers and over 
supply should in turn discourage some of the producers. In both cases, this would mean that 
the balance between demand and offer could be reestablished. However, this could happen 
only if the market was left to function freely. Smith mentioned the large number of players, 
the free flow of goods, resources and information, as key conditions for the free play of the 
competitive mechanism (Smith 1999: I, vii). At the same time, Smith pointed to different 
forms of tampering with the market mechanism that he argued should be avoided or at least 
limited as much as possible. One was about individual market players themselves and „people 
of the same trade‟ who „seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices‟ 
(Smith 1999: I, x, 232). This part of Adam Smith‟s work has generally been neglected but it is 
clear that Adam Smith was conscious that competitive markets – where the miracle of the 
invisible hand can play its part – were not automatically self-sustaining. He was conscious 
furthermore that the threats could come from individual players and private interests 
themselves. The other, more obvious form of tampering, which has been so symbolically 
associated with economic liberalism – in the European sense of the term – since Adam Smith, 
is that to be attributed to the state and political authorities. Adam Smith systematically and 
regularly denounced this form of tampering with „naturally self-regulating markets‟.  
 
No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond 
what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it 
might not otherwise have gone: and it is by no means certain that this artificial 
direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into which it would 
have gone of its own accord (Smith 1999: IV, ii, 3) 
 
 
2.2 The Forgotten Ethics of Adam Smith 
 
Reading Adam Smith only through The Wealth of Nations gives a peculiar picture of the 
ethical dimensions of capitalism. The moral imperative, in Smithian capitalism, seems to be 
that individuals should maximize their self-interest – hence be selfish and greedy. This is a 
world beyond – or rather before – good and evil. „Economic man‟ is „natural man‟ – hence 
pre-dating in his behaviour social, political or moral codes of conduct. A miracle, though, 
happens through the assumed but mysterious alchemy of the market and its „invisible hand‟. 
The aggregation of multiple a- and un-ethical individual actions turns into a morally and 
ethically satisfying collective good. In The Wealth of Nations, individuals are a-moral; the 
market though is inherently albeit mysteriously producing a moral order. In that book, the 
moral or ethical nature and power of the market has the characteristics of a constitutive 
assumption, a „foundation myth‟ more than it is scientifically demonstrated (Nelson 2001).  
 The idea that the market is a moral structure – beyond the dimension of efficiency – is 
still with us today. It is present in all variants of neo-classical economic theory, as „natural 
law‟ – hence unchallenged, unquestioned and not to be scientifically demonstrated (Nelson 
2001). Arguably, this is one of the most striking – and consequential – legacies of The Wealth 
of Nations. If the market is indeed a moral and ethical structure, then a direct consequence 
should be that there is no need to bring in ethical considerations at the level of individual 
behaviours. Furthermore, the reasoning could well be that if we attempted to do that, we 
would only distort and disturb the natural regulative mechanisms of the market (Friedman 
1962). Hence, we could be tampering with and destroying the capacity of the market to 
produce a morally satisfying collective good. A correlate conclusion could then well be that 
capitalism will be working at its best when individual behaviours are left unfettered and free 
to explore all the paths leading to a maximization of self-interest, including when those paths 
could be judged to be a- or un-ethical. 
 This rendering or interpretation of Adam Smith‟s thought becomes more problematic 
when we consider not only The Wealth of Nations but also the Theory of Moral Sentiments. In 
The Wealth of Nations, economic man is pre-social – in the sense that the natural propensity 
to trade and barter precedes the social contract. But trading and bartering imply contacts and 
interdependence and in that sense human nature is profoundly social – individuals are not and 
cannot be self-sufficient monads. This becomes all the clearer when we read The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. The market and its invisible hand reveal a Rational (ie Divine) plan and 
order and individuals are linked to each other in and through that plan (Nelson, 1991). The 
theological dimension of economics has been neutralized today to a great extent (albeit not 
fully, ie. Nelson, 2001). It is relatively absent from The Wealth of Nations but highly visible 
in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The individuals placed in this Rational/Divine scheme are 
endowed – presumably by the Author of Nature – with certain faculties (such as reason or 
imagination) and particular propensities (Smith, 1982). 
 There are two such propensities – self-love that expresses itself in particular in the 
maximization of self-interest but also „fellow feeling‟ as the first sentence of the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments shows: 
 How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it 
(Smith, 1982: I.i.1.1). 
 
Fellow feeling, as much as self-love, is a survival kit and a condition of man‟s fitness for that 
social state and interdependence in which he finds himself by divine design. Fellow feeling 
implies sympathy and empathy. It means a disposition to seek the approval of his fellows and 
also to be worthy of approval: 
 
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to 
please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren... The desire of approbation, and 
this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him 
fit for that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him not 
only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be 
approved of; or of being what he himself approves in other men (Smith, 1982: III.2.6-7).  
 
 
2.3 The Missing Link – The Structuring Ethics of the Wealth of Nations 
 
The search for approval and worthiness points to the ideas of „propriety‟ and „restraints‟ 
(including self-imposed ones) and hence to an ethical project. The individual has a natural 
disposition to form judgments (applied both to herself and others) concerning what is fit and 
proper to be done or to be avoided. But since this natural disposition may conflict with self-
love, it is probably not enough, Smith tells us, as a source of control. It should be strengthened 
and reinforced by the setting up of socially defined „general rules concerning what is fit and 
proper‟ – the latter resulting from an inductive generalization of continual observations upon 
the conduct of human beings and ultimately revealing the commands and laws of the Deity 
(Smith, 1982: III.4.8). 
 This code of morality – this ethical project – may be the missing link in The Wealth of 
Nations; the one that could explain that the aggregation of self-interested actions turns 
ultimately into a morally satisfying collective good. A code of morality that would be deeply 
inscribed in the individuals themselves – although it may sometimes conflict with and 
contradict self-love – could create the basis for collective self-restraint and relative harmony. 
It appears, in fact, when we read The Wealth of Nations and the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
together, that the proper workings of the market and its ethical character were deeply 
conditioned for Adam Smith by the presence of what could be called an ethical foundation 
infusing through all individual actors – even if that ethical foundation could conflict on a 
case-by-case basis with the pressures of self-interest.  
 
 
 
3. Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism  
 
Once we stand there in our reading of Adam Smith, we are not too far in fact from Max 
Weber and from his account of the dynamics and balance of early modern capitalism. Max 
Weber pointed to the profound ethical structure underpinning modern capitalism and 
sustaining its early development and expansion. This silent structure acted through 
socialization and deep personal appropriation by individual actors. Hence in a sense, just like 
„fellow-feeling‟ and its associated code of morality, this deep and silent structure was mostly 
invisible. Nevertheless, it was highly real and consequential in Weber‟s account. It was an 
important mechanism of both movement and stability, of both the dynamics of capitalism and 
its sustainability.  
 
3.1 Calvinism and its Invisible Hand 
 
In the Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber explored the fit and the 
elective affinities existing between the Calvinist creed and a particular form of rationality or 
„spirit‟ associated with modern capitalism (Weber, 1958; Giddens, 1971). Max Weber 
differentiated between several ideal types of capitalism that had marked history in varying 
ways. Leaving aside predatory, trade or warfare capitalism, Max Weber was mostly fascinated 
by the emergence in early modern Europe and in Puritan North America of what he termed 
„rational capitalism‟. He saw that form as more than just an impulse for acquisition and in fact 
he defined it as being „identical with the restraint, or at least a rational tempering, of this 
irrational impulse‟ (Weber, 1958: 17). Capitalism, he argued, „is identical with the pursuit of 
profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise‟ 
(Weber, 1958: 17). 
 The first signs of emergence of that form of rational and systematic capitalistic 
accumulation were found, Max Weber tells us, in a modernizing European continent. The 
birth of rational capitalism depended upon and was associated with free labour, the 
development of the Western city, the structuring of the nation state, the progressive separation 
of the productive enterprise from the household and accounting innovations such as double 
entry bookkeeping. The argument of Max Weber, however, is that those structural and 
material conditions were necessary but not sufficient to account for the development and 
expansion of rational capitalism. The key there, for him, was the existence of a propensity in 
human beings to behave in such a rational, accumulative but also restrained manner (Weber, 
1958: 20). According to Max Weber, such a propensity was not linked in any way to „human 
nature‟. Rather, it was highly conditioned by the spiritual and religious context in which 
individual and collective actions were embedded. And in contrast, when this propensity has 
„been obstructed by spiritual obstacles, the development of rational economic conduct has 
also met serious inner resistance‟ (Weber, 1958: 26-27). 
 The next stage in Max Weber‟s demonstration was to show that some forms of 
Protestant denominations – particularly those associated with the teachings of Jean Calvin – 
were indeed quite conducive to the emergence and stabilization of such a propensity in given 
populations. Hence, the main explanation for the rapid expansion of rational capitalism in 
early modern Europe and Puritan America was, according to Max Weber, the encounter, the 
fit and the affinity between the material conditions identified above and the spiritual tenets of 
Calvinist Puritanism. The ethics associated with that type of religious denominations were a 
deep structure fuelling and fostering the propensity towards rational capitalist accumulation. 
Calvinist ethics were in other words in very close elective affinity with the spirit that was 
necessary for that type of capitalism to develop and expand. That type of normative structure 
worked through collective socialization and deep individual appropriation and in a sense 
acculturation. To that extent, it was indeed „invisible‟ and nevertheless highly powerful – 
framing behaviours, interactions and mindsets a priori and hence reducing the need for 
external constraints, controls and expressions of power.  
 Jean Calvin was a Franco-Swiss preacher. Together with Martin Luther, he was a key 
actor of the Protestant Reformation movement in Europe during the 16
th
 century. An 
important element of Calvinist teachings was the doctrine of predestination. The original 
version of that doctrine was extremely rigid. The Calvinist God was a stern and all-powerful 
master planner that had divided humanity from immemorial times between a few that were 
elect and would be saved and the rest who would be damned. The Universe was created to 
further the glory of God and the motives of that almighty God were beyond human 
understanding. The division between those bound for damnation and those who would be 
saved was fully pre-determined. When born, a particular individual was already assigned to 
one of those two categories without having any means to know which – and even less power 
to change his or her fate. Good deeds, human merits or repentance could have no impact 
whatsoever on whether one was part of the elects or not. In this rigid version, the doctrine of 
predestination was a source of deep existential anguish and pessimistic disillusion. It 
produced an „unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual‟ (Weber, 1958: 104). 
 
3.2 From Calvinist Doctrine to Practical Ethics 
 
In such a rigid form, this doctrine was too harsh and unbearable. Practical takes on the 
doctrine of predestination hence soon emerged. It was a duty to consider oneself one of the 
chosen. And it was possible to look for the signs of salvation in a positive contribution to the 
glorification of God‟s Kingdom on earth and in „intense worldly activity‟ (Weber, 1958: 111-
12). This could be done through an absolute focus on one‟s „calling‟. The idea of the calling – 
or „Beruf‟ – was that each single one of us was put on this planet by the Great Master Planner 
into a particular position and with a particular duty. Signs of our election could be found in 
the successful accomplishment of our „Beruf‟. In contrast, the refusal to do one‟s calling, the 
refusal to work so as to help fructify God‟s pre-ordained world turned into a sign of 
damnation. Quite unlike what was the case in Catholicism, where the highest form of 
religious sentiment was otherworldly contemplation and the denial of the self and of the world 
as symbolized by the monk, in Calvinism the fulfilment of one's duty in worldly affairs was 
the highest form that the moral and religious activity of individuals could take (Weber, 1958: 
108-10). 
 In that context, the creation of wealth became a clear sign of divine election. But in 
Calvinism, existential anguish was a permanent state – and the search for signs of election 
also was and should be permanent. And in fact, „the God of Calvinism demanded of his 
believers not single good works but a life of good works combined in a unified system‟ 
(Weber, 1958: 117). The wealth that was being created was not created for enjoyment and it 
should not be used towards self-aggrandizement. Wealth should not lead to personal pride; it 
should not on the other hand be used as a tool to diminish, harm or exploit others. Nobody, 
after all, was responsible for his or her own salvation or damnation; nobody „deserved‟ one or 
the other – we are all just being confronted to a mysterious divine scheme. And all of us have 
our place and our position – necessary and predefined – in the earthly expression of that 
divine scheme. Acquisition should not be pursued to satisfy material needs and allow 
pleasure. In fact, straying away from an ascetic work ethic – through enjoyment, pleasures, 
unnecessary spending, pride, spite or the use of wealth to exert power – may be interpreted as 
signs of damnation. Wealth should be created and immediately and forever reinvested to 
fructify further God‟s Kingdom on earth. And the greater the possessions, „the heavier, if the 
ascetic attitude toward life stands the test, the feeling of responsibility for them, for holding 
them undiminished for the glory of God and increasing them by restless effort‟ (Weber, 
1958:170). 
 
3.3 The Prophecy of Max Weber 
 
Such combination of a rational and perpetual search for accumulation and wealth creation 
with an ascetic lifestyle proved to be a perfect spiritual ground for the development of modern 
rational capitalism. And for Max Weber, the encounter between the early material conditions 
for rational capitalist accumulation and the Calvinist ethos turned out to represent one of those 
moments when history accelerated. The Calvinist ethos was the spiritual fuel that structured 
and stabilized at its beginnings the emerging capitalist order. Hence, from that perspective, 
modern rational capitalism was indeed a deeply moral and ethical order. But it was so 
historically and not essentially or naturally and, as Max Weber showed, this difference was 
highly consequential.  
 The prophecy of Max Weber, at the dawn of the twentieth century, was that modern 
capitalism was already in the process of „losing its soul‟ and its moral and ethical backbone. 
And in fact, the Calvinist revolution in itself had been an important step towards a 
disenchantment of the world.  
 
The rationalization of the world, the elimination of magic as a means to salvation, the 
Catholics had not carried nearly so far as the Puritans had done. To the Catholic…the 
priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation and who held 
the key to eternal life in his hand (Weber, 1958: 117). 
 
The practical ethics of Calvinism generated their own internal contradictions. In time, the 
latter were coming to weaken the invisible spiritual structure of developing capitalism. 
Calvinism, in its doctrinal form, denied individuals the very possibility of contact with a 
jealous, all powerful and sternly hidden Deity. The only approximation to such an interaction 
was in fact indirect, through intense activity in this world – leading to the production of riches 
and hence to a furthering of God‟s Kingdom on earth. The rationalisation of economic life 
was therefore initially tightly connected to an ethical and religious project that required and 
implied its own material and this worldly translation. Such materialization of a spiritual 
project, though, inherently generated tensions. Wealth and the materialism associated with its 
production were seen by Max Weber to have a deeply secularizing influence (Weber 1958: 
174). As a consequence, they were bound, he argued, to weaken the spiritual structure that 
originally sustained them. Max Weber found the best descriptive expression of that process in 
a text written by John Wesley already at the end of the 18
th
 century. Founder of the Methodist 
movement, John Wesley feared that 
 
…wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same 
proportion. Therefore, I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of things, for any 
revival of true religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both 
industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so 
will pride, anger and love of the world in all its branches…So, although the form of 
religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away (Wesley as quoted in Southey, 
1855: 308).  
 
 
 
4. Towards The ‘Iron Cage’ – The Disenchantment of Capitalism in the 
United States  
 
The prophecy of Max Weber was in process already in the United States during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. American capitalism was on its way to „losing its soul‟, 
becoming „disenchanted‟ and hence turning into an „iron cage‟. 
 
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism 
was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly 
morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic 
order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which today determine the lives of all individuals who are born into this 
mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with 
irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal 
is burnt….In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of 
wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with 
purely mundane passions…(Weber, 1958: 181-82). 
 
There were essentially two sources of pressure, we argue, driving the process of 
disenchantment in the United States. On the one hand, the rapidly increasing clout of social 
Darwinism undeniably played a role. On the other hand, the deep institutional transformations 
that were profoundly reshaping American capitalism also pushed in that same direction. 
 
4.1 Social Darwinism....  
 
In his Origins of Species (1859), Darwin outlined one general law that „led to the 
advancement of all organic beings – namely multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the 
weakest die‟. The argument was that minor transformations or variations in living organisms 
resulted either from the chance process of reproduction or from the use or lack of use of 
certain organs in the context of a changing environment. These transformations or variations 
were „selected‟ and stabilized in a particular species if they gave an adaptative advantage to 
those organisms which had developed them first – advantage measured by survival and 
reproductive success. „Selection‟, in other words, happened through the „struggle for life‟. 
And this „struggle for life‟ took place at different levels – between individuals from the same 
species, across species or directly between individuals and the environment or physical 
conditions of life.  
Very rapidly, the evolutionary argument proposed by Charles Darwin was adapted and 
transferred to social sciences. The idea was that what applied to man as an animal or as an 
organism could also work for the study of man as a social, cultural or political being. Charles 
Darwin himself turned out to play a key role in that transfer and he undeniably was one of the 
first „Social Darwinists‟ (Hawkins, 1997, Jones, 1978). As such, he believed that most 
features of social and human life – ethics, religion, political institutions, the rise and fall of 
nations and civilisations as well as psychological or behavioral characteristics – followed the 
general law of evolution. Variation was triggered through confrontation with the environment, 
other practices or chance encounters. Selection followed through „struggle for life‟ and 
„survival of the fittest‟, leading to the disappearance of those features and practices that 
„failed‟, appearing less „fit‟ or inadequatly adapted. From there, it was relatively easy to 
associate evolutionary change with social, human, or even moral progress. And this indeed 
has often been a feature of social Darwinian arguments. Charles Darwin himself did not shy 
away from deducing the superiority of civilized anglo-saxon nations over other countries from 
his general law of evolution (Hawkins, 1997).  
To this day, evolutionary theory has been quite directly and obviously related to the 
work of Charles Darwin. One should not forget, however, the role of Herbert Spencer in 
shaping evolutionary theories in the social sciences. And, in particular, Spencer‟s „theory of 
inevitable progress‟ had quite a significant impact in the United States. It was instrumental in 
shaping the local versions and readings of the evolutionary argument. From 1848 to 1853, 
Spencer was editor at The Economist, the key British financial weekly that was then already a 
mouthpiece of liberal economic thinking in its purest form. One rapid and somewhat 
schematic way to describe Herbert Spencer and place his contribution to the evolutionary 
argument relative to that of Charles Darwin is to say that Spencer was somewhat of an 
extremist and definitely a determinist. In his first book, Social Statics (1851), he claimed that 
 
Progress, therefore, is not an accident but a necessity…. The modifications mankind 
has undergone and is still undergoing result from a law underlying the whole organic 
creation. And provided the human race continues and the constitution of things 
remains the same, those modifications must end in completeness and progress. 
 
 
4.2 ....And its transfer to the United States 
 
For the most part, the evolutionary argument was transferred to the United States in its 
Spencerian rather than Darwinian version. From the beginning, evolutionary theory and 
liberal economic thinking were highly intermixed and intertwined in that country (Hawkins, 
1997). There were clear elective affinities, in any case, between both ideologies and they 
combined on American soil, strengthening each other in the process. The Spencerian variant 
of the evolutionary argument was positive and quite optimistic. Progress was the necessary 
outcome of evolution, as long however as the natural process of evolution was left full and 
free rein. Spencer identified the struggle for survival as the main mechanism around which 
this natural process was articulated. And this struggle for survival was often associated, 
combined and conflated in his writings and those of his followers with the liberal economists‟ 
understanding of competition. Free and unhampered competition emerged as the principal 
mechanism of the evolutionary process – a mecanism bringing about both variation and 
selection. 
Such a Panglossian view of evolution and a deterministic sense of inescapable 
progress meant that Spencer believed in and championed strict laissez faire. Any kind of 
interference could only be detrimental to the longer term and natural evolutionary process. 
There was no need whatsoever, in the Spencerian world, for politics, collective bargainings or 
welfare initiatives. Furthermore even, not only was there no need for those but they could be 
highly destructive. They were bound to disrupt the natural process that should lead to the 
„survival of the fittest‟ and to the shouldering aside of the weak. Herbert Spencer was the real 
author of that phrase which became such an icon in American evolutionary theory as well as, 
episodically but regularly, in American economic practice.  
 Progress was an end that justified the means. And progress was endogenous to the 
system. It could only be defined in a circular way and it was measured in fact by survival. It 
did not have any more the spiritual dimension that had been associated with Calvinist 
Capitalism. Capitalism was clearly losing its „soul‟ there and capitalism was turning into a 
self-reinforcing „iron cage‟. To play itself out, „survival of the fittest‟ – ie progress – required 
an entirely unfettered and free field for individual action. Gone was the fellow feeling of 
Adam Smith as a necessary foundation of market interactions. Gone also were the self-control 
of the Calvinist and his inscription within a higher order project – that of ensuring his own 
spiritual salvation through serving God in his earthly Kingdom.   
The transfer of social darwinism in its Spencerian variants from the old to the new 
continent took place in the few years before and after 1870. The Spencerian argument did 
resonate particularly well with the conditions that characterized the United States after the 
Civil War. Hence, it spread fast and was eagerly appropriated. This was a time of upheaval, 
turbulence, transformations and unpredictable developments where the old rules were 
inadequate and the new ones still to be invented (Kolko, 1963; Chernow, 1990). In that 
context, Spencer‟s ideas became the intellectual foundation for the social Darwinism that 
came to characterize the „Robber Barons‟. The „Robber Barons‟ were that generation of 
businessmen that thrived initially on the chaotic conditions associated with the American 
Civil War and then established firmly their power and legitimacy during the period of 
corporate reinvention of American capitalism, at the end of the 19
th
 century (Sklar, 1988; 
Zunz, 1990; Roy, 1997; Djelic, 1998). The „muckracker‟ journalists, and in particular 
Matthew Josephson were the first to use the label „Robber Barons‟ to refer to the capitalist 
captains in that period of American history (Josephson 1932). Spencer‟s ideas also spread 
within American intellectual circles, with significant impact in particular in American 
universities. Amongst the most famous and influential American champions of Spencerian 
evolutionism were John Fiske (philosopher and historian), William Graham Sumner 
(professor of political economy at Yale) or William James (Harvard) (Hawkins, 1997).  
When Herbert Spencer went to the United States in 1882, he was received with the 
highest honors. Andrew Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller revered him (Chernow, 1998). 
Spencerian evolutionism could, in and of itself, justify – including in a moral sense – the 
brutal tactics that were then characteristic of American capitalism. Violent and rapacious 
behaviour, in the context of „free‟, in the sense of wild competition, were identified as 
necessary means leading to progress through struggle. The „elimination‟ of the weak and the 
institutionalization of a hierarchical and unequal division of labor were also given legitimacy 
in this way. The Robber Barons were unsurprisingly the first to seize upon an ideology that 
turned in this way struggle, violence and brutal use of power into necessary steps towards 
progress (Hawkins, 1997).  
The spread, in the United States, of social Darwinism in its Spencerian form proved to 
be, in retrospect, an important factor contributing to and hastening the secularization of 
capitalism in that country. The idea of an emergent natural order was a common dimension of 
economic liberalism in its Smithian variant, of Calvinism and of social Darwinism in the 
Spencerian version. In all three bodies of thought, that natural order was considered to be 
beyond human intervention. In fact, in all three cases, that order could only be revealed if 
natural laws were left free play. Natural laws had a divine dimension both in Calvinism and in 
a complete reading of Adam Smith. In the version of economic liberalism that forgot the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, though, as well as in Spencerian social Darwinism, natural laws 
were essentially mechanistic. They had no „deeper meaning‟, no ethical foundation – they just 
were there to be reckoned with.  
Like Calvinism, economic liberalism and Spencerian social Darwinism were highly 
conservative ideologies but they were so in a different sense. Calvinism justified the status 
quo and the position that all occupied in the divine scheme of things was reflected in the 
social hierarchies of this world. There was, however, room for all in this world – the weak and 
the strong, those who would be damned and those who would be saved. Economic liberalism 
in its mechanistic variant and Spencerian social Darwinism justified instead the logics of 
evolutionary dynamics – and the survival of only the fittest and most competitive, which 
implied as correlate the disappearance, death or disintegration of the weak and the least 
competitive. Those logics were not (and should not be) mitigated by any form of self-restraint 
or „fellow feeling‟ – as had been the case both in a full reading of Smithian liberalism or in 
Calvinist capitalism. Instead, the fight of all against all should be given absolutely free play 
even if it expressed itself in the most violent and brutal manner. In that context, ethics were 
reconstructed as mere obstacles – just like laws, regulation and state intervention – to the free 
play of natural, mechanistic, forces. Ethics, as a consequence, did not belong with economic 
logics and were in fact bound to disturb those logics.  
 
4.3 The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism 
 In spite of an apparent intellectual affinity between economic liberalism, Calvinism and 
Spencerian social Darwinism, the argument here is therefore that the deep ideological 
structure sustaining capitalism changed significantly in the United States towards the end of 
the 19
th
 century. The secularization of capitalism happened through the progressive 
marginalization of spiritual motives for economic action – as predicted both by John Wesley 
and Max Weber. Calvinism gave way and a combination of mechanistic liberalism and 
Spencerian social Darwinism progressively took over and imposed itself as the intellectual 
structuring frame for capitalist dynamics. 
 This subtle but nevertheless highly significant intellectual evolution correlated in the 
United States, reinforced and was being reinforced by profound structural transformations that 
were in fact redefining the meaning of capitalism in that country. Fathers of the American 
Constitution, and Thomas Jefferson in particular, had identified freedom as a constitutive 
element of the future American social and economic space (McCoy, 1996). In sparsely 
populated and essentially rural territories, the ideal typical situation of many individual and 
independent entrepreneurs, competing healthily in a mostly unregulated environment, seemed 
a legitimate ambition. Such a „proprietary-competitive‟ – one could say classical liberal – type 
of capitalism appeared to embody freedom, the very spirit of the new Nation (Sklar 1988). 
The small firm was an economic but also a moral entity. The individual acquired through it 
not only the means of his physical survival but also the means of his freedom– essentially 
independence, wealth and social status. Like motherhood and apple pie, the small firm was 
the stuff of the American dream.  
In a short period of time, though, during those years bridging the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, the economic component of the American dream would come to be radically 
redefined. By the 1920s, „big‟ was undeniably becoming „efficient‟, if not always „beautiful‟ 
in the American economy (Sklar, 1988; McCraw, 1984; Adams and Brock 2004). A corporate 
version of capitalism, increasingly regulated at the federal level, was pushing the small 
producer republic to the periphery of the national economy. Emerging within the context of 
significant economic and technological disruptions, corporate capitalism had also been shaped 
within particular historical and institutional conditions. The reconstruction of American 
capitalism, or the invention of corporate capitalism, was in fact a fairly messy process, 
revealing social and political confrontations as much as it was reflecting economic and 
technological evolution. The institutional environment, particularly in its political and 
legislative dimensions, set significant constraints. Still, the multiplicity of actors, 
characterized by bounded rationalities as well as divergent and complex motives, meant that 
unintended and contingent developments played a part.  
The American Civil War and its associated disruptions set the stage to the structural 
revolution that characterized American capitalism. In a mostly unregulated and fairly 
turbulent environment such as had been the case during that period of war, business 
arrangements and agreements had multiplied – mostly in the form of loose cartels or trusts. 
This generated a public concern with the „trust question‟ – reflecting the growing power of 
those large business aggregates and their use of ruthless practices in what came to resemble 
economic warfare (Lloyd, 1894; Josephson, 1932; Chernow, 1998). The growing uproar and 
discontent amidst, in particular, small independent business owners and western or southern 
farmers indicated that the „trust question‟ could indeed have destabilizing effects on the 
American social and political scene. The pressure was such that the American Congress did 
enact first a legislation regulating railroads – the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 – and, a 
few years later, a general antitrust act – the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.  
The intent behind the Sherman Act was initially to curb the threat that aggregates of 
economic power were perceived to represent and to reestablish the conditions for free and fair 
competition. The unique set of conditions, however, in which this Act was enacted limited its 
domain of applicability and had unintended consequences of significance (Peritz, 1996). Early 
court cases showed that cartels and other „restraints of trade or commerce‟ across the states of 
the Union would be prohibited per se. As a Federal legislation, however, the Sherman Act did 
not apply within states. Tight combinations or mergers within the legal frame of particular 
states that made them possible (such as New Jersey) seemed to fall outside its reach (Roy, 
1997). And corporate lawyers were soon identifying mergers as an alternative to cartelization, 
legal under Sherman Act (Sklar,1988). The passing of the Sherman Act was thus indirectly a 
triggering force in the first American merger wave (1895-1904). In an irony of history, the 
fight for competition in the United States led to the emergence of large, integrated firms and 
contributed to the oligopolistic reorganization of American industries. The Sherman Act was 
read as per se outlawing cartels and loose forms of agreements. With respect to size, however, 
and hence mergers, the interpretation that ultimately came to dominate in the Supreme Court 
was that illegality stemmed not from size per se but from „unreasonableness‟ – as revealed by 
the proven intent and purpose to exclude others and stifle competition (Peritz, 1996). By the 
1920s, both the per se prohibition of cartels and the „rule of reason‟ with respect to mergers 
had become trademarks and defining features of the American antitrust tradition. In the 
United States, collusion and cooperation between independent firms became legally and 
morally impossible. Instead, competition was valued – but in practice the American antitrust 
tradition was fostering oligopolistic competition and not the type of classical competition 
championed by Adam Smith and other liberal economists (Djelic, 2002). Those highly 
significant early first steps triggered in turn other consequential transformations, leading 
ultimately to a profound reinvention of capitalism in the United States. We identify here six 
pillars or dimensions that define the form of capitalism emerging in the process. The latter is 
quite different indeed from the Smithian (or Jeffersonian) ideal of classical liberalism.  
Those six dimensions have emerged in the United States in quite unique historical and 
institutional conditions and sometimes even in quite unexpected ways (Fligstein, 1990; Roy, 
1997; Djelic, 1998; Lipartito and Sicilia, 2004). First, as we have seen, the very meaning of 
competition came to differ significantly. In the emerging corporate capitalism, the competitive 
logic was that of oligopolistic markets policed by antitrust (Djelic, 2002). Second, the large-
scale merger wave associated with the oligopolistic reorganization of industries led to the 
dominance of large and capital intensive firms (Chandler, 1962; 1990). Third, the constitution 
of large firms often through mergers and acquisitions at the end of the 19
th
 century was made 
possible by and required a change in legal status. The joint stock corporation with dispersed 
ownership became quite common as a legal structure in American capitalism (Roy 1997, 
Lipartito and Sicilia, 2004). Four, those joint stock corporations were listed on stock 
exchanges where they found a large share of the vast capital they required (Navin and Sears, 
1955). Five, those corporations also soon came to be ruled by professional managers, whose 
legitimacy did not reside in ownership rights (Berle and Means; 1932). Six, the separation 
between ownership and the everyday handling of company affairs turned out to be a major 
revolution. It triggered the emergence of a profession – management – and the structuring of 
an organizational field around that profession (Sutton et al., 1956; Zunz, 1990).  
The structural transformation of capitalism could only reinforce the process of 
disenchantment that was already at work. The separation of ownership and control, in 
particular, had consequences of significance. An important consequence was that the link 
between work and wealth creation was severed – turning a class of formerly hard working and 
ascetic business owners into a leisure class living to spend what their money (and not their 
work) had earned (Veblen, 1924). A second consequence was the professionalization of 
management that ensued from the transformed meaning of ownership (Berle and Means, 
1932). When ownership means holding a few shares in a large corporation, it does not grant 
the right to manage or decide. The void is then filled by the professionalization of the 
management activity and by the rapid development of a new class – that of professional 
managers. The professionalization of management has meant one further step towards a 
rationalization of the economic sphere. The pervading influence of science, associated with 
such professionalization, could only render more anachronistic references to and reliance 
upon spiritual motives in that sphere. Finally, the corporate revolution in the United States has 
vastly expanded in time the scope of the „iron cage‟ while tightening the latter further. The 
corporate revolution has transformed large numbers of petty owners, farmers or entrepreneurs 
into the salaried servants – whether as operatives or managers – of the new corporations. 
Progressively, but ever so rapidly, the possibilities to escape the corporate and organizational 
cage have become increasingly rare (Perrow, 2001). This has been true both in the private and 
in the public sectors, in law, medicine or education. The cage, indeed, has become all but 
inescapable at the same time that it was losing its soul or „spirit‟ (Weber, 1958: 181). 
 
 
5. Conclusion – Beyond Robber Baron Capitalism?  
 
Originally, modern capitalism reflected a spiritual and ethical project. One can agree or 
disagree with the ethical agenda that underpinned the development of modern capitalism. 
Nevertheless, it is probably fair to argue that this partly invisible but quite strong ethical and 
spiritual structure was a powerful fuel, initially, of the rapid development of rational 
capitalism. Internal contradictions in a system that turned spirituality into materialism 
combined with ideological shifts and structural pressures to weaken, in time, the spiritual and 
ethical superstructure of modern capitalism. Although the process has naturally been much 
more multi-faceted, it makes some sense, symbolically, to associate this progressive 
disenchantment with the triumph, in the United States, of Robber Baron capitalism.  
 
5.1 Robber Barons and the Search for Redemption 
 
Interestingly, Robber Barons as a group had many characteristics of a transitional force. They 
led the way from one world to another with brutal energy and nevertheless unconscious 
regrets and nostalgia. Seizing upon the ideological combination of mechanistic liberalism and 
social Darwinism, they launched into a raw „struggle for life‟. They justified and legitimated 
their individual thirst for ever greater personal wealth and power as being part of a 
progressive collective scheme – where survival indicated superiority („fit‟) and superiority 
(„fit‟) was measured by survival (Josephson, 1932; Dolson, 1959; Gordon, 1988, Chandler, 
1986). The social world was a raw evolutionary scene where an unhampered struggle of all 
against all would lead to progress and collective good.  
 In their private lives, many of those Robber Barons were of protestant lineage and 
quite attuned in fact, through their parents, grand parents and families to the ethical and 
spiritual dimension of capitalism (Josephson, 1932; Winkelman, 1937; Chernow, 1990; 1998; 
Stasz 1995). In their daily actions as businessmen, they evacuated and rejected the spiritual 
dimension and the ethical restraints that had underpinned the economic behaviour of their 
parents or grand parents. They only played by the rule of self-interest and its maximization 
(Schreiner, 1995). Fellow-feeling was left on the wayside not only of economic action but 
also quite often of their lives. The biographies of many of those men show a dire lack of 
fellow-feeling and in some cases even heartless violence in their closest personal relationships 
– with their wives and children in particular (Josephson, 1932; Wall, 1970; Chernow, 1990). 
At least, this was generally the case during the longest part of their lives – the part when they 
were in full activity.  
 But then, another pattern emerged towards the end of their lives. As if in a search for 
redemption, when the day of reckoning was getting near, Robber Barons turned 
philanthropists (Josephson, 1932; Winkelman, 1937; Flynn, 1941; Nevins, 1953). This 
happened to a whole generation from the 1910s to the 1930s – and most of the big private 
American Foundations were created then. The wealth that had been accumulated through 
sometimes violent maximization of self-interest suddenly seemed to burn their fingers. The 
last years of many Robber Barons were busily spent redistributing some of that wealth 
through good deeds. Fellow-feeling finally expressed itself and sometimes on a big scale. 
Money was spent on education, health, social and cultural projects. Motives, as they can be 
reconstructed, were mixed. Naturally, part of that can be explained by the search for social 
legitimacy in a period when muckrackers were violently denouncing, in the United States, the 
ways in which many Robber Barons had accumulated wealth (Sinclair, 1988; Tarbell, 1905; 
1924; Brady, 1984). But buying back one‟s reputation in this world was probably not enough 
to explain the scale and scope of the philanthropist involvement. Undeniably, existential fears 
also played a role. The need to feel chosen and hence saved was getting more urgent and the 
Puritan God required a life of „good works‟. Because wealth had often been created in such a 
ruthless manner, its redemptive power was probably not so obvious, including to the Robber 
Barons themselves. The consequence was that they fell back on what can be called a „catholic 
pattern‟ – trying to make up for past behaviours through alms and good deeds: 
 
The giving and receiving of heart offerings without price, deeds that win crowns and 
sceptres in Heaven (Mrs Jane Leland Stanford, Inscriptions, Memorial Church at 
Stanford University). 
 
 
5.2 Capitalism as an a-Ethical System 
 
This generation brutally accelerated the transformation of capitalism into an a-ethical system, 
simply preoccupied with the creation of wealth as an end in itself. However, this generation 
was also a transitory one that still inscribed itself in the spiritual heritage that had marked the 
development of early modern capitalism. The turn to philanthropy in the later part of their 
lives showed that. In most cases, their lifestyles also showed that. Many of those Robber 
Barons were highly ascetic men and imposed an ascetic lifestyle on their families, in spite of 
their incalculable wealth (Chernow, 1990; 1998, Stasz, 1995). 
 By the end of the Robber Barons period, however, and of its associated ideological 
and structural transformations, the spirit had all but left the cage. Ethical and spiritual 
preoccupations were clearly becoming separated from daily economic practice (and theory). 
In a sense, the strict separation between wealth creation and philanthropic redistribution, as 
pioneered by the Robber Barons, would come to characterize the world of the twentieth 
century. The economic logic, the logic of wealth creation differed significantly and should be 
unrelated to ethical projects and behaviours – and vice-versa. This has undeniably left us with 
a profoundly a-ethical system of economic production. Contemporary capitalism is a system 
beyond good and evil – and the aggregation of self-interest maximizing behaviours does not 
spontaneously lead to an ethical and moral collective good, far from it. If it is to exist, this 
ethical and moral collective good has to be defined as a political project. It can only articulate 
with the contemporary capitalist architecture through a regulatory agenda that could be 
proposed and championed at the national and/or at the transnational level (Djelic and Quack, 
2003; Dunning, 2003; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2005). 
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